

**ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS OF MEXICAN AND
ARAB IDENTITY: DEMOGRAPHIC AND
SOCIOECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS**

by

Jen'nan Ghazal Read
January 2006

Jen'nan Ghazal Read, Ph.D. is a Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Irvine. This work was developed under a subcontract with Sabre Systems, Inc. and utilized funds provided by the U.S. Census Bureau. The opinions expressed in this work are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of either Sabre Systems, Inc. or the Census Bureau.

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ABSTRACT

The Mexican and Arab populations in the United States can be defined by a number of census questions—by race/ethnicity, ancestry, place of birth, and/or language—but little is known about how using alternative definitions of identity affect the size and characteristics of these groups. This report examines this question using combined data from the 1 percent and 5 percent Public Use Microdata Samples in Census 2000 (i.e., 6 percent for a larger sample). The analysis uses the standard method of classifying the Mexican and Arab populations (Hispanic origin and ancestry questions, respectively) as reference categories to explore differences across the range of possible permutations of identity. In the Arab case, I extend the standard ancestry classification to consider place of birth (Arab countries) and language (Arabic). In the Mexican case, I extend the standard Hispanic origin definition to include place of birth (Mexico) and ancestry (Mexican, Chicano, etc.). The results show that adding persons who were born in an Arab country but did not respond to the question on ancestry increases the size of the Arab population by 15.9 percent and adding persons born in an Arab country and/or who speak Arabic in the home increases it by 24.9 percent (cumulative percent). On average, persons in these categories are newer immigrants, slightly less educated, and more likely to be in poverty than Arab population as a group. For the Mexican population, adding persons who responded with a Mexican ancestry but did not respond to the Hispanic origin question increases the size of the Mexican population by 8.8 percent and adding persons who were born in Mexico along with ancestry increases it by 10.2 percent (cumulative percent). In contrast to the Arab case, persons in these categories (especially the ancestry respondents) are well-educated and less likely to be in poverty than the Mexican population as a whole. In both the Mexican and Arab cases, the inclusion of these groups does little to change the overall national profile of the populations relative to the majority U.S. population.

BACKGROUND

Over the past two decades, there has been a considerable shift in how we define U.S. racial and ethnic populations. Once viewed as ascribed biological categories, social scientists now emphasize the social construction of race and ethnicity and conceptualize group identity as an important component of individuals' subjective self-definitions (Calhoun 1994; Waters 1990). Racial and ethnic group memberships are not objective social categories, but rather individually-negotiated, culturally-embedded meaning systems produced from societal discourse and debate (see review by Frable 1997).

The current method of classifying and enumerating the Mexican and Arab populations in the United States illustrates the social construction of group identities. Both groups continue to receive a proportionally large number of immigrants and both, theoretically, can be defined by any number of census questions. In reality, however, the Mexican population is identified primarily with the Hispanic origin question on the short form of the Census, which is administered to all U.S. households, while the Arab population is identified using the ancestry question on the long form of the Census, which is administered to only 1 in 6 U.S. households. These methods of classification have been the topic of considerable discussion among policy makers, researchers, and community activists.

A closer examination of the Arab case is illustrative. According to Census 2000, there are 1.19 million persons of Arab ancestry in the United States, which represents a 40 percent increase over the past decade from 860,000 persons in 1990 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2003). However, many scholars and community leaders contend that these figures undercount considerably the Arab population (Samhan 1999; Zogby 1990). The reasons most often cited for the possible undercount include: 1) limited collection of ancestry data (i.e., only on the long form of the Census sent to one in six households); 2) placement of the ancestry question (i.e., item #10 on the long form); 3) wording of the ancestry question (i.e., confusing terminology and examples); 4) exclusion of groups considered by some to be Arab (e.g., Sudanese); and 5) low response rate due to general community distrust toward governmental data collection.

This report does not attempt to address these issues because most of them cannot be assessed systematically with existing data. Instead, I take a different approach and ask, "What more can Census data tell us about U.S. racial/ethnic groups, limitations notwithstanding?" More specifically, are there other ways of defining populations that change what we know about these groups? Looking at the Mexican and Arab populations, do alternative definitions of identity alter the size and socio-demographic characteristics of these groups? In the Arab case, I extend the standard ancestry classification to consider place of birth (Arab countries)¹ and language (Arabic). In the Mexican case, I extend the standard Hispanic origin definition to include place of birth

¹ Arab countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen.

(Mexico) and ancestry (Mexican, Chicano). Spanish language can not be used to identify the Mexican population because it is a language shared with other Hispanic origin groups.²

The report will focus on four objectives: 1) to identify and compile a list of the full range of possible identity categories using questions on Hispanic origin, place of birth, ancestry, and language; 2) to determine the extent of overlap in the aforementioned identity categories. For example, what proportion of Mexicans identified by the Hispanic origin question is also Mexican by place of birth and/or ancestry? 3) to calculate the percentage change in the size of the group based on the various categories. For example, to what extent does the addition of persons speaking Arabic at home change the standard classification of the Arab population (and so forth with all possible permutations)? 4) to assess changes in the socio-demographic characteristics of these two populations when alternative definitions of identity are employed. These objectives help lay the foundation for the final report, which will focus on determining whether alternative definitions of identity tells us anything meaningful about U.S. racial and ethnic groups. In other words, to what extent is it reasonable to include these alternative definitions, and to what degree should the Census Bureau consider altering current methods for identifying racial/ethnic populations?

Data for this report consist of the combined 1 and 5 percent Public Use Microdata Samples from Census 2000. The combined files provide larger sample sizes, which is useful when separating a relatively small population into multiple subgroups (i.e., ancestry, place of birth, language). For ease of presentation, the report is separated into two sections; the first section focuses on Arabs and the second on Mexicans. This is an effective way of organizing and presenting the findings because there are unique methods for identifying each group, and the implications of using alternative definitions of identity are different for each group. The text in each section is as similar as possible for clarity.

THE ARAB CASE

Identification and Size

The standard method of identifying the Arab population has been historically with the first response to the ancestry question (ancestry 1) and, more recently, with the first and/or second responses (ancestry 1 and/or 2) (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1990, 2005). Appendix A lists the full range of Arab ancestry response categories, and Table A-1 provides the frequency distribution for the first and second ancestry responses in 2000 (categories with no responses in Census 2000 are shown in the appendix but excluded from Table A-1, such as “Aden”).

² An examination of write-in responses is beyond the scope of this project because it requires access to internal Census data.

Similar to figures published by the U.S. Census Bureau, the combined 6 percent file yields 1.17 million persons³ who reported at least one Arab ancestry in 2000 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2003). As seen in Table A-1, slightly more than 1 million persons claimed Arab ancestry as their first ancestry, and 180,000 listed an Arab response as their second ancestry. There is some overlap in these categories, which is illustrated in Table A-2: of the total 1.17 million persons reporting Arab ancestry, 84.6 percent reported it as their first ancestry only, 14.3 percent reported it as their second ancestry only, and 1.1 percent listed it as both their first and second ancestry choices. Of those who listed an Arab response as their first ancestry only, the vast majority (82 percent) did not list a second ancestry, 12 percent listed a Western European ancestry, and 2 percent reported an Eastern European ancestry. Of the 14.3 percent who listed an Arab response as their second ancestry, 64.5 percent listed a Western European first ancestry, 9.6 percent reported an Eastern European one, and 4.7 percent reported a North American first ancestry.

The largest ancestry subgroup originates from Lebanon (Table A-1). More than one-third (35.3 percent) of the 1 million persons reporting an Arab ancestry as a first response are Lebanese, followed by Egyptians (13.2 percent), Syrians (10.9 percent), and Palestinians (7.1 percent). The majority (50.7 percent) of persons reporting an Arab ancestry as a second response are Lebanese, with Syrian being the second most frequent response (20.3 percent). While Yemenis and Iraqis are smaller in number, they have experienced the fastest growth over the past decade. The U.S. Yemeni community is up from 4,093 to 11,683 persons (tripled), and the size of the Iraqi population is up from 23,212 to 37,717 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2003: Table A-1).

To this point in the analysis, the results match those tabulated by the U.S. Census Bureau and are not surprising since we are using the standard ancestry definition (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2005). We next turn to an examination of the central question of how different definitions of identity change the size and characteristics of the Arab population. The two primary categories of interest are place of birth and Arabic language spoken in the home. Table A-3 lists the countries included in the analysis, and for consistency, we use the countries that match the ancestry categories (i.e., excludes countries that some consider Arab, such as Sudan); for presentation purposes, we only show those countries that contain respondents.

It is important to note that there is overlap in country of birth and ancestry, which we address in the next part of the analysis. In other words, many people born in an Arab country also list an Arab ancestry. We do not double-count these people in the alternate definition; rather we are interested in those persons born in an Arab country but who did not list an Arab ancestry on ancestry 1 or 2 (same thing for persons who speak Arabic at home). Table A-3 shows that slightly over 0.5 million persons listed their place of birth

³ Our figures are slightly different from the official U.S. Census count of 1.19 million because we are working with the combined 6 percent PUMS rather than the 100 percent file.

as an Arab country. Egypt (21.1 percent), Lebanon (20.1 percent), Iraq (16.9 percent), and Syria (9.9 percent) are the largest countries of representation.

Table A-4 demonstrates the degree of overlap in these various definitions of identity and shows the change in size of the population when various definitions are used. The first category in the table (ancestry 1) represents a commonly used identifier by researchers accessing the Public Use Microdata files because it is the easiest marker of Arab identity. But using this category alone results in a 14 percent reduction in the standard classification of the population (difference between 1.17 million and 1.00 million). The second, third, and fourth categories show that only using ancestry 2 (0.18 million), Arab place of birth (0.55 million), or Arabic language at home (0.62 million) alone would severely reduce the size of the Arab population. These three categories are really just simulations and are not that meaningful since there is little chance that any of them would be used in isolation to identify persons of Arab descent.

The fifth category (ancestry 1 and 2) represents the official categorization of the Arab population and is used by researchers who have more advanced skills working with Census Bureau files. The multiple category responses that follow present various combinations when place of birth and language are considered alone and in tandem. As seen in Table A-4, adding persons born in an Arab country but who did not list an Arab ancestry to the standard definition increases the size of the population by 15.9 percent to 1.36 million. Adding persons who speak Arabic in the home but who did not mark an Arab ancestry (blank or other) increases the population by 12.8 percent to 1.32 million. The most inclusive definition as defined by the theoretical framework in this study combines ancestry 1 and 2, Arab place of birth, and Arabic language for a total of 1.46 million persons, or an increase of 24.9 percent (291,670) from the standard Census definition.

Figure A-1 illustrates the degree of overlap among the possible definitions of Arab identity shown in Table A-4 and decomposes the percentage that each subgroup contributes to the entire population (using the most inclusive definition of 1.5 million).⁴ The white circle represents ancestry 1 and/or 2 (standard definition), the light gray circle represents persons who speak Arabic at home, and the dark gray circle is for those who were born in an Arab country. As seen in the Figure A-1, 20 percent of the Arab population can be classified as having the strongest Arab identification, reporting an Arab ancestry, an Arab place of birth, and speaking Arabic at home. Another 17.3 percent report an Arab ancestry in combination with either Arab place of birth or speaking Arabic at home, and a sizeable (42.8 percent) group only reports an Arab ancestry. The most interesting subgroups for the purposes of this study are those that fall *outside* of the white circle (i.e., did not claim an Arab ancestry but can be identified with other markers).

⁴ Note: The percentages in the figure will not match the percentages in Table A-4 because the figure decomposes the percentage that each group contributes to the 1.45 million, while the Table shows the percentage change from 1.17 million (standard definition) when the group is added.

Here we see that a full 20 percent of the 1.5 million do not claim an Arab ancestry but were born in Arab country (9.7), speak Arabic at home (7.2), or both (3.1 percent).

Table A-5 takes a closer look at the “unmeasured” population of 291,670 persons (hereafter referred to as “alternative definition” group); those who did not respond with an Arab ancestry (1 or 2) but who were born in an Arab country and/or who speak Arabic at home. The first column shows that the plurality (141,708 persons) of this group was born in an Arab country but do not speak Arabic at home, and adding these persons to the standard definition would increase the size of the Arab population by 12.1 percent. There are at least two possible explanations for this group: either they are non-Arabs born in an Arab country or they are Arab persons born abroad who immigrated at a young age. The latter explanation seems more plausible than the former, given the low number of non-nationals born in Arab countries in general (Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2003). The second column shows that 105,166 persons speak Arabic at home but were not born in an Arab country, and adding this group to the standard classification would increase the size of the population by 9.0 percent. The most likely explanation for this subgroup is that they are second-generation offspring who live in immigrant homes, where the native language is still practiced (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Unlike the Spanish language, Arabic is not a common language among non-native speakers in the United States. Another possibility is that these are non-Arabs who are married to Arabs and learn to speak Arabic. Finally, Table A-5 shows that 44,796 persons were born in an Arab country *and* speak Arabic at home, and adding this group would increase the Arab population by 3.8 percent. Including this group would be the most conservative estimate.

Demographic and Socio-economic Implications

To this point, we have only looked at changes in the *size* of the Arab population when different definitions of identity are employed. This next section examines the social and demographic characteristics of this alternative definition group and assesses the extent to which adding this population to the standard definition group alters the overall profile of Arabs in America. The logic of Tables A-6 to A-8 is as follows: Table A-6 first assesses whether the socio-demographic characteristics of the alternative group are significantly different from those of the standard group (t-tests), Table A-7 examines whether combining the alternative group with the standard group changes the overall profile of the Arab population, and finally, Table A-8 places these alternative identity groups in a broader comparative framework with the total U.S. population.

What is immediately apparent in Table A-6 is that the alternative definition group differs significantly from the standard definition group on all characteristics except for sex composition. The alternative definition group is more diverse in terms of racial identification, with one-fourth (22.7 percent) identifying with a non-white category (13.5 percent identify as “black” and 5.0 percent as “Asian”). Compare this to the 96.6 percent of the standard definition group who identify as white. Though relatively well educated, the alternative definition group is considerably less likely to have a bachelor’s degree or

higher compared to the standard group (29.9 percent compared to 41.8 percent). They are also less likely to be employed than the standard group and more likely to work fewer hours and to be in poverty. In sum, Table A-6 indicates that the alternative definition group is less advantaged than the standard definition of the Arab population in terms of socio-economic characteristics.

Table A-7 examines how the addition of the alternative definition group to the standard group changes the profile of Arab population. We add nativity and English language ability to this table but exclude it from Table A-6 because they are not meaningful when examining the characteristics of a predominantly foreign-born group (i.e., Arab place of birth). We cannot run t-tests to check for significant differences because the first group is a subset of the second. As seen in the table, the addition of the alternative group has expected effects to the population profile—it decreases the proportion who identify as white; tips the balance of the immigrant composition more toward the foreign-born (decrease from 60.1 percent U.S.-born to 54.0 percent); decreases the population’s education levels, labor force activity, occupational status (e.g. professional/managerial, service), and income; and increases the poverty rate. It is important to note that most of the changes are small, in part due to differences in the size of the two groups (291,670 compared to 1.2 million).

Despite these changes, Table A-8 shows that the addition of the alternative definition group does little to alter the overall advantaged profile of the Arab population relative to the U.S. population. Arabs have considerably higher levels of educational attainment (39.0 percent with a bachelor’s degree or higher compared to 25.6 percent) and are more likely to occupy professional/managerial positions (41.3 percent compared to 33.6 percent). However, the question remains: “If the size of the alternative (or unmeasured) population continues to grow, then how will this affect the Arab population as a whole?”⁵ Further, how will public policy be able to address the needs of a less advantaged group if there continues to be no mechanism for identifying the group? These questions will be addressed in the final report.

THE MEXICAN CASE

Identification and Size

This section examines how alternative definitions of identity alter the size and characteristics of the Mexican population. The standard method of identifying the Mexican population is with responses to the Hispanic origin question (U.S. Census Bureau 2000). The ancestry and/or place of birth questions are not used, in part because some contend that “trying to develop a composite measure of Hispanic ethnicity using a combination of responses from the Hispanic origin, place of birth, and ancestry questions

⁵ Ancillary analyses with 1990 Census data show that the alternative definition group has grown in the past ten years, relative to the size of the overall population.

undermines the principle of self-identification and can lead to endless discussion about who is “Hispanic” and what is the size of the Hispanic population” (Cresce and Ramirez 2003: 7).⁶

This report takes a different stance and contends that the ancestry and/or place of birth questions are additional methods of self-identification. The analysis that follows assesses empirically how the use of these additional classification methods affects the Mexican population. Appendix A lists the full range of response categories for Hispanic origin (Mexican), place of birth (Mexico), and ancestry (Mexican, Mexican American, Mexicano, Chicano, La Raza, Mexican American Indian, Mexican State), and Table B-1 lists the frequency distributions for each of the responses on Census 2000.

As seen in Table B-1, there are 20.9 million persons who identify themselves as “Mexican” in response to the Hispanic origin question, 9.3 million who were born in Mexico, 17.9 million who report a Mexican ancestry as a first response, and 0.5 million who report a Mexican ancestry as a second response. There is definitely overlap in these categories, as some respondents fall into all four groups and some fall into only one. Tables B-2 and B-3 and Figure B-1 help clarify these intersecting identities. Table B-2 shows that there is very little overlap in persons responding with a Mexican marker on the ancestry questions: 99.9 percent of the 17.9 million persons classified as “Mexican” with responses to ancestry 1 did not respond with a Mexican marker to ancestry 2 (either no response or other ancestry). If we limit the analysis to those who are not captured by the standard classification method, we see an interesting relationship between ancestry and place of birth responses (Table B-3). Table B-3 shows that 1.8 million persons provided a Mexican ancestry response on Census 2000 and 0.7 million persons reported being born in Mexico. But the vast majority of persons that gave ancestry responses (79.0 percent) were not born in Mexico, suggesting that the ancestry question is capturing a more assimilated group who consider themselves of Mexican descent.

Table B-4 demonstrates the degree of overlap in these various definitions of identity and shows the change in size of the population when various definitions are used. The first category in the table (Hispanic origin—Mexican) represents the official categorization of the Mexican population. The second, third, and fourth categories are simulations that show that using alternative definitions in isolation from the standard definition would reduce the size of the population severely: using ancestry 1 alone would decrease the population size by 14.3, ancestry 2 alone by 97.7 percent, and place of birth alone by 55.3 percent. These three categories are not that meaningful since there is little chance that any of them would be used in isolation to identify persons of Mexican descent.

The multiple category responses that follow present various combinations when Hispanic origin, ancestry, and place of birth are considered alone and in tandem. Table B-4 shows that adding persons who responded with a Mexican ancestry (ancestry 1) to the standard

⁶ Cresce and Ramirez are interested in “Hispanic” rather than defining who are “Mexican” per se, but their argument would also apply to defining the Mexican population.

definition would increase the size of the Mexican population by 7.7 percent; adding ancestry 1 and 2 would increase it by 8.8 percent. Given the large size of the Mexican population, these increments are not trivial, representing roughly a 2 million person increase. The final row shows that adding ancestry 1, ancestry 2, and place of birth to the standard definition would increase the population by 10.2 percent.

Figure B-1 puts these categories into perspective by illustrating the degree of overlap among the possible definitions of Mexican identity and decomposing the percentage that each subgroup contributes to the entire population (using the most inclusive definition of 23 million). The white circle represents Hispanic origin-Mexican respondents (standard definition), the light gray circle represents persons who responded with a Mexican ancestry (1 and/or 2), and the dark gray circle is for those who were born in Mexico. One-third (7.4 million or 32.1 percent) of the 23 million persons fall into the most intensive categorization of the Mexican population—they are Mexican by birth, by ancestry, and by Hispanic origin. This 7.4 million also makes up roughly one-third (35.4 percent) of the Hispanic origin-Mexican population (i.e., standard definition).

For the purposes of this report, the most interesting groups are those that fall outside of the white circle—those who were born in Mexico and/or report a Mexican ancestry but did not respond with “Mexican” on the Hispanic origin question. Here we see that 386,015 persons were born in Mexico and report a Mexican ancestry. Adding this group to the standard definition would be the safest estimate because the persons were both born in Mexico and reported a Mexican ancestry (i.e., highly likely that they are Mexican). Adding this group would increase the size of the Mexican population by 1.7 percent. Including those who only say they were born in Mexico is probably the most risky estimate because persons could be born in Mexico but not be of Mexican heritage (including these persons would increase the population by only 1.2 percent). Perhaps the most interesting group is the 1.5 million ancestry respondents. These persons claim a Mexican ancestry but do not self-identify as Mexican on the Hispanic origin question, which raises the issue of how respondents perceive these two questions. Taken together, the ancestry and place of birth groups (i.e., the unmeasured or alternative definition group) would increase the size of the standard definition of the Mexican population by 10.2 percent.

Demographic and Socio-economic Implications

To this point, we have only looked at changes in the *size* of the Mexican population when different definitions of identity are employed. This next section examines the social and demographic characteristics of this alternative definition group and assesses the extent to which adding this population to the standard definition group alters the overall profile of the Mexican population. The logic of Tables B-5 to B-7 is as follows: Table B-5 first assesses whether the socio-demographic characteristics of the alternative group are significantly different from those of the standard group (t-tests), Table B-6 examines whether combining the alternative group with the standard group changes the overall

profile of the Mexican population, and finally, Table B-7 compares these alternative identity groups to the total U.S. population through comparisons of socio-economic characteristics.

Table B-5 shows that the alternative definition group differs significantly from the standard definition group on most characteristics. The alternative definition group is more likely to self-identify as white alone, 50.7 percent compared to 47.3 percent of the standard definition group. The alternative definition group is also better educated than the Mexican population identified with the Hispanic origin question: 54.3 percent have a high school diploma or higher (compared to 45.8 percent), 8.6 percent with a bachelor's degree or higher (compared to 7.5), and 2.6 with a graduate degree or higher (compared to 2.4 percent but not significantly different). Although the alternative definition group is slightly less likely to be in the labor force (59.6 percent compared to 61.8 percent of the standard definition group), they are also less likely to be in poverty (21.5 percent and 23.2 percent). Overall, Table B-5 indicates that the alternative definition group is generally more advantaged than the standard definition of the Mexican population. It is important to note that this pattern is the exact opposite of than what we found for the Arab case, where the alternative definition group was less advantaged in terms of socio-economic characteristics relative to the standard definition group.

Table B-6 next examines how the addition of the alternative definition group to the standard group changes the profile of the Mexican population. We add nativity and English language ability to this table but exclude it from Table B-5 because they are not meaningful when examining the characteristics of a predominantly foreign-born group (i.e., place of birth). We cannot run t-tests to check for significant differences because the first group is a subset of the second. As seen in the table, the addition of the alternative group has expected effects to the population profile—it increases the proportion who identify as white; tips the balance of the immigrant composition more toward the native-born (increase from 58.5 percent U.S.-born to 59.6 percent); increases the population's education levels, occupational status, and mean income; and decreases the poverty rate. Again, these patterns are the exact opposite as those seen in the Arab case (Table A-7). It is important to note that most of the changes are small, in part due to differences in the size of the two groups (2.1 million compared to 20.8 million).

Finally, Table B-7 shows that the addition of the alternative definition group to the standard definition of the Mexican population does little to alter the overall minority profile (i.e., disadvantaged) of this group relative to the U.S. population. Regardless of how the Mexican population is defined, they have much lower levels of educational attainment than the U.S. population (only 7.6 percent of the inclusive definition group has a bachelor's degree or higher compared to 25.6 percent); they are less likely to occupy professional/managerial positions (15.3 percent compared to 33.6 percent); they have much lower levels of median household income (\$33,400 compared to \$42,187); and they are much more likely to be in poverty (23.0 percent compared to 12.4 percent) In sum, using the inclusive definition of the Mexican population rather than the original definition does not change the socio-economic differences between the Mexican population and the

total U.S. population. At the very least, future research must consider whether and how the current method for identifying the single largest immigrant population in the United States affects the outcomes in question.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This report examined the extent to which using alternative definitions of identity affect the size and characteristics of U.S. racial/ethnic groups, using Mexicans and Arabs as case studies. While these two groups may seem unusual ones for comparison, they provide an ideal opportunity to explore a range of alternative methods for classifying U.S. populations, in addition to the standard methods currently used. For Mexicans, this entailed extending the standard definition (Hispanic origin-Mexican) to include place of birth (Mexico) and ancestry (Mexican, Chicano, etc.). For Arabs, this entailed extending the standard definition (ancestry 1 and 2) to consider place of birth (Arab countries) and language (Arabic).

In the Arab case, the results showed that adding persons who were born in an Arab country but did not provide an Arab response to the ancestry question increased the size of the Arab population by 15.9 percent and adding persons born in an Arab country and/or who spoke Arabic in the home increased it by 24.9 percent (cumulative percent). On average, persons in these alternative definition categories were newer immigrants, slightly less educated, and more likely to be in poverty than the Arab population as a whole. Thus, one plausible explanation for the lack of an Arab ancestry response from these persons is that they did not understand the question (a finding confirmed by qualitative research conducted by the Arab American Institute in its efforts to increase Arab participation in the 2000 census). Other possible explanations are that these persons are non-Arabs married to Arabs (and thus speak Arabic at home) and/or are born in a different country but not of Arab ancestry (i.e., reported a different ancestry). This would refute the argument that persons misunderstand the ancestry question. I will examine this possibility in more detail in the next phase of the analysis, but preliminary results suggest that the vast majority of the alternative definition group report no ancestry at all, suggesting that they might indeed be of Arab descent.

The results for Mexicans showed that adding persons who responded with a Mexican ancestry but did not respond to the Hispanic origin question increased the size of the Mexican population by 8.8 percent and adding persons who were born in Mexico along with ancestry increased it by 10.2 percent (cumulative percent). In contrast to the Arab case, persons in these categories (especially the ancestry respondents) were more educated and less likely to be in poverty than the Mexican population as a whole. Thus, one possible explanation for the lack of a Hispanic origin-Mexican response is that these persons are more assimilated (i.e., second, third, and fourth generation non-immigrants) who affiliate with a Mexican ancestry but do not consider it their primary identity. The next phase of the analysis will explore whether these persons affiliate with a Hispanic origin other than Mexican.

It is important to note that in both the Mexican and Arab cases, the inclusion of the alternative definition groups did little to change the overall national profile of the populations relative to the majority U.S. population. In part, this reflects the relatively small size of the alternative definition groups when compared to the larger size of the Mexican and Arab populations as a whole. Thus, adding the alternative definition group to the larger pool has a minimal impact on the average characteristics of the groups as whole. However, if the alternative definition group grows at a faster pace than the larger population, their impact would also grow. Future research will need to monitor these changes and assess the implications for classifying America's racial and ethnic populations. If the current patterns continue, the implications for the Arab population is that the most socio-economically disadvantaged may be missed in standard classification methods. The opposite would be true for the Mexican population, where the more affluent are not captured.

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Appendix A. Arab Identity Categories, Census 2000

<u>ANCESTRY</u>		<u>PLACE OF BIRTH</u>		<u>LANGUAGE</u>	
<u>Code</u>	<u>Category</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Category</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Category</u>
471	Aden	400	Algeria	777	Arabic
400	Algerian	201	Bahrain		
412	Alhucemas	414	Egypt		
495	Arab	213	Iraq		
496	Arabic	216	Jordan		
415	Bahrain	222	Kuwait		
441	Bedouin	224	Lebanon		
413	Berber	430	Libya		
402	Egyptian	436	Morocco		
466	Gaza Strip	230	Oman		
407	Ifni	234	Qatar		
417	Iraqi	235	Saudi Arabia		
421	Jordan	239	Syria		
442	Kurdish	456	Tunisia		
444	Kuria Muria Islander	245	United Arab Emirates		
423	Kuwaiti	248	Yemen		
425	Lebanese				
404	Libyan				
490	Mideast				
406	Moroccan				
437	Muscat				
411	North African				
436	Omani				
465	Palestinian				
439	Qatar				
414	Rio De Oro				
427	Saudi Arabian				
470	South Yemen				
429	Syrian				
422	Transjordan				
438	Trucial States				
408	Tunisian				
480	United Arab Emirates				
467	West Bank				
435	Yemeni				

Table A-1. Weighted Frequencies for Arab Ancestry Responses, Census 2000¹

<u>ANCESTRY 1</u>			<u>ANCESTRY 2</u>		
	Number	Percent		Number	Percent
Total.....	1,004,858		Total.....	180,158	
Algerian	835	0.1	Algerian	195	0.1
Arab	77012	7.7	Arab	10059	5.6
Arabic	110598	11.0	Arabic	11045	6.1
Berber	208	0.0	Berber	18	0
Egyptian	133057	13.2	Egyptian	9150	5.1
Gaza Strip	16	0.0	Gaza Strip	0	0
Iraqi	32421	3.2	Iraqi	4247	2.4
Jordanian	39264	3.9	Jordanian	2143	1.2
Kurdish	1432	0.1	Kurdish	17	0
Kuwaiti	575	0.1	Kuwaiti	0	0
Lebanese	355206	35.3	Lebanese	91412	50.7
Libyan	309	0.0	Libyan	18	0
Mideast	25278	2.5	Mideast	3188	1.8
Moroccan	33651	3.3	Moroccan	5851	3.2
North African	700	0.1	North African	33	0
Omani	61	0.0	Omani	0	0
Palestinian	71034	7.1	Palestinian	5156	2.9
Qatari	19	0.0	Qatari	0	0
Saudi Arabian	1692	0.2	Saudi Arabian	64	0
Syrian	109510	10.9	Syrian	36512	20.3
Tunisian	511	0.1	Tunisian	210	0.1
United Arab Emirates	126	0.0	United Arab Emirates	0	0
West Bank	0	0.0	West Bank	0	0
Yemeni	11343	1.1	Yemeni	839	0.5

¹ Combined 1% and 5% Public Use Microdata Samples.

Table A-2. Degree of Overlap in Arab Ancestry Responses

		<u>Ancestry 1</u>		
		No	Yes	
<u>Ancestry 2</u>	No	0	992,508	992,508
	Yes	167,808	12,350	180,158
		Total		
		167,808	1,004,858	1,172,666

¹ Combined 1% and 5% Public Use Microdata Samples.

Table A-3. Weighted Frequencies for Arab Place of Birth, Census 2000¹

Place of Birth	Number	Percent
Total	553,823	100.0
Algeria	11,132	2.0
Bahrain	444	0.1
Egypt	116,753	21.1
Iraq	93,484	16.9
Jordan	50,547	9.1
Kuwait	22,094	3.9
Lebanon	111,111	20.1
Libya	1,231	0.2
Morocco	40,993	7.4
Oman	188	0.1
Qatar	286	0.1
Saudi Arabia	28,303	5.1
Syria	54,835	9.9
Tunisia	1,100	0.2
United Arab Emirates	1,398	0.3
Yemen	19,924	3.6

¹ Combined 1% and 5% Public Use Microdata Samples.


Table A-4. Range of Arab Identity Categories¹

CATEGORIES ²	Unweighted N	Percentage Change from Ancestry 1 and 2 (Unweighted)	Weighted N	Percentage Change from Ancestry 1 and 2 (Weighted)
Single category				
Ancestry 1 alone	54,225	-14.8 %	1,004,858	-14.3 %
Ancestry 2 alone	10,102	-84.1 %	180,158	-84.6 %
Place of Birth alone (POB)	29,316	-53.9 %	553,823	-52.8 %
Arabic Language alone	32,488	-49.0 %	621,030	-47.0 %
Two categories				
Ancestry 1 or Ancestry 2	63,652	N/A	1,172,666	N/A
Ancestry 1 or POB	64,587	1.5 %	1,198,405	2.2 %
Ancestry 1 or Language	62,292	-2.1 %	1,159,331	-1.1 %
Ancestry 2 or POB	38,934	-38.8 %	724,539	-38.2 %
Ancestry 2 or Language	42,175	-33.7 %	792,847	-32.4 %
POB or Language	44,248	-30.5 %	836,957	-28.6 %
Three categories				
Ancestry 1 or Ancestry 2 or POB	73,653	15.7 %	1,359,170	15.9 %
Ancestry 1 or Ancestry 2 or Language	71,502	12.3 %	1,322,628	12.8 %
Ancestry 1 or POB or Language	70,305	10.5 %	1,306,425	11.4 %
Ancestry 2 or POB or Language	53,625	-15.8 %	1,002,959	-14.5 %
Four categories				
Ancestry 1 or Ancestry 2 or POB or Language	79,229	24.5 %	1,464,336	24.9 %

¹ Frequencies are based on 2000 Census Public Use Microdata Samples, combined 1% and 5 % data files (6%)

² The categories are comprised of the responses in Appendix A.

Figure A-1. Degree of Overlap in Arab Identity Categories



**Table A-5. Persons born in an Arab country and/or speak Arabic at home
(Limited to those who did not respond as Arab to Ancestry 1 or 2)**

		<u>Arabic language at home</u>		
		No	Yes	
<u>Born in Arab country</u>	No	0	105,166	105,166
	Yes	141,708	44,796	186,505
		Total		
		141,708	149,962	291,670

Table A-6. Sociodemographic Differences Between Alternative Identity Groups

	STANDARD DEFINITION (Ancestry 1 and/or 2)		ALTERNATIVE DEFINITION (Place of Birth and/or Language)		
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	P-value
Population	1,172,666		291,670		
Race					
White alone		81.0 %	64.8 %		P<.0001
White and some other race		15.6 %	12.4 %		P<.0001
Black		1.4 %	13.5 %		P<.0001
Asian		0.6 %	5.0 %		P<.0001
Hawaii/Pacific Islander/Native American		0.1 %	0.4 %		P<.0001
Other race alone		1.0 %	2.2 %		P<.0001
All other combinations		0.4 %	1.5 %		P<.0001
Educational Attainment					
Persons 25 years and over	698,154		210,486		
High school graduate or higher		86.2 %	75.2 %		P<.0001
Bachelor's degree or higher		41.8 %	29.9 %		P<.0001
Graduate degree or higher		17.2 %	12.1 %		P<.0001
Labor Force Status					
Persons 16 years and over	850,592		247,715		
In civilian labor force		64.9 % ^a	57.5 % ^a		P<.0001
Employed (in civilian LF)		61.6 % ^a	53.4 % ^a		P<.0001
Unemployed (in civilian LF)		5.0 % ^b	7.1 % ^b		P<.0001
Not in labor force		34.9 % ^a	42.0 % ^a		P<.0001
Mean hours worked		1923.6 ^c	1855.3 ^c		P<.0001
Poverty rate					
All Persons (in household)		13.3 %	17.3 %		P<.0001
Age and sex					
Male		54.3 %	53.8 %		P=.240
Mean age		31.2	37.0		P<.0001

a= Among those 16 years or older

b= Among those 16 years or older and in civilian labor force

c= Among those 16 years or older and employed

Table A-7. Socio-demographic Differences Between Standard and Inclusive Definitions

	<u>STANDARD DEFINITION</u> (Ancestry 1 and/or 2)			<u>INCLUSIVE DEFINITION</u> (Ancestry 1,2; POB; Language)		
	Number	Percent		Number	Percent	
Race	1,172,666	100.0 %		1,464,336	100.0 %	
White alone		81.0 %			77.8 %	
White and some other race		15.6 %			15.0 %	
Black		1.4 %			3.8 %	
Asian		0.6 %			1.5 %	
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander/Native American		0.1 %			0.2 %	
Other race alone		1.0 %			1.2 %	
All other combinations		0.4 %			0.6 %	
Nativity and Year of Entry						
All persons	1,172,666	100.0 %		1,464,336	100.0 %	
Native		60.1 %			54.0 %	
Foreign born		39.9 %			46.0 %	
Entered before 1990		56.2 % ^a			56.1 % ^a	
Entered between 1990-2000		43.9 % ^a			43.9 % ^a	
Naturalized citizen		54.5 % ^a			53.8 % ^a	
Not a citizen		45.5 % ^a			46.2 % ^a	
Educational Attainment						
Persons 25 years and over	698,154			908,640		
High school graduate or higher		86.2 %			83.6 %	
Bachelor's degree or higher		41.8 %			39.0 %	
Graduate degree or higher		17.2 %			16.0 %	
Ability to Speak English						
Persons 5 years and over	1,064,654			1,352,347		
Speak other language at home		54.0 %			61.2 %	
Do not speak English very well		18.4 % ^b			21.5 % ^b	
Persons 5 years and over in households	1,047,350			1,325,238		
In linguistically isolated households		9.0 %			10.5 %	
Labor Force Status						
Persons 16 years and over	850,592			1,098,307		
In civilian labor force		64.9 %			63.2 %	
Employed (in civilian LF)		61.6 % ^c			59.8 % ^c	
Unemployed (in civilian LF)		5.0 % ^d			5.4 % ^d	
Not in labor force		34.9 % ^c			36.5 % ^c	
Mean hours worked		1932.6 ^e			1909.8 ^e	
Occupation						
Employed persons 16 years and over	526,425	100.0 %		660,069	100.0 %	
Mgmt, professional, related occupations		42.7 %			41.3 %	
Service		11.8 %			12.1 %	
Sales and office		30.2 %			30.0 %	
Farming, fishing, and forestry		0.1 %			0.1 %	

Construction, extraction, maintenance	5.2 %	5.6 %
Production, transportation, moving	9.8 %	10.6 %
Military	0.2 %	0.2 %
INCOME in 1999		
Households		
Median income (dollars)	48,200	46,700
Mean income (dollars)	69,410	67,198
Poverty rate (all persons in household)	13.3 %	14.1 %
Household size		
Average number of persons in household	2.9	2.9
Marital status		
Persons 15 years and over	866,630	1,117,908
Now married	57.6 %	57.6 %
Widowed	4.1 %	4.3 %
Divorced	7.1 %	7.0 %
Separated	1.4 %	1.6 %
Never married	29.9 %	29.5 %
Number of own children under 18 years old living in household for women age 35-44^f	1.8	1.8
Age and sex		
Male	54.3 %	54.2 %
Mean age	31.2	32.3
a= Among foreign born people	d= Among 16 or older in civilian labor force	
b= Among 5 or older.	e= Among 16 or older and employed	
c= Among 16 or older	f = Women who are householder or spouse of householder	

Table A-8. Comparison of Arab Identity Categories to U.S. Population

	<u>Standard Definition</u> (Ancestry 1 and/or 2)		<u>Inclusive Definition</u> (Ancestry 1, 2; POB; Language)		<u>U.S. Population</u>	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Total Population	1,172,666		1,464,336		281,421,906	
Race		100.0 %		100.0 %		100.0 %
White alone or with some other race		96.6 % ^a		92.7 % ^a		77.1 %
Educational Attainment						
Persons 25 years and over						
High school graduate or higher		86.2 %		83.6 %		84.1 %
Bachelor's degree or higher		41.8 %		39.0 %		25.6 %
Labor Force Status						
Persons 16 years and over	850,592		1,098,307		217,168,077	
Employed (in civilian LF)		61.6 %		59.8 %		59.7 %
Unemployed (in civilian LF)		5.0 %		5.4 %		5.8 %
Not in labor force		34.9 %		36.5 %		36.1 %
Occupation						
Management, professional, and related occupations		42.7 %		41.3 %		33.6 %
INCOME in 1999						
Households						
Median income (dollars)	48,200		46,700		42,187	
Poverty rate						
All persons (in household)		13.3 %		14.1 %		12.4 %

a= % of white alone and white with anything else is combined

Appendix B. Mexican Identity Categories, Census 2000

Code	<u>HISPANIC ORIGIN</u> Category	Code	<u>ANCESTRY</u> Category	Code	<u>PLACE OF BIRTH</u> Category
2	Mexican	210	Mexican	303	Mexico
		211	Mexican American		
		212	Mexicano		
		213	Chicano		
		214	La Raza		
			Mexican American		
		215	Indian		
		218	Mexican State		

Table B-1. Weighted Frequencies for Mexican Identity Responses, Census 2000¹

<u>HISPANIC ORIGIN</u>			<u>PLACE OF BIRTH</u>		
	Number	Percent		Number	Percent
	Total.....	20,881,890		Total.....	9,324,341
Mexican	20,881,890	100.0	Mexico	9,324,341	100.0

<u>ANCESTRY 1</u>			<u>ANCESTRY 2</u>		
	Number	Percent		Number	Percent
	Total.....	17,888,672		Total.....	472,726
Mexican	14,020,115	78.4	Mexican	418,155	88.5
Mexican American	1,597,451	8.9	Mexican American	36,949	7.8
Mexicano	1,829,335	10.2	Mexicano	3,707	0.8
Chicano	64,585	0.4	Chicano	1,610	0.3
Mexican American Indian	66,075	0.4	Mexican American Indian	7,305	1.6
Mexican State	311,111	1.7	Mexican State	5,001	1.1

¹ Combined 1% and 5% Public Use Microdata Samples.

Table B-2. Degree of Overlap in Mexican Ancestry Responses

		<u>Ancestry 1</u>		
		No	Yes	
<u>Ancestry 2</u>	No	0	17,887,537	17,887,537
	Yes	471,591	1,135	472,726
		Total		
		471,591	17,888,672	18,360,263

¹ Combined 1% and 5% Public Use Microdata Samples.

**Table B-3. Cross tabulation table for people who were born in Mexico and/or have Mexican Ancestry 1,2
(Limited to those who did not respond to Hispanic Origin as Mexican)**

		<u>Born in Mexico</u>		
		No	Yes	
<u>Mexican Ancestry 1 and/or 2</u>	No	0	283,349	283,349
	Yes	1,452,107	386,015	1,838,122
		Total		
		1,452,107	669,365	2,121,471

Table B-4. Possible Mexican Identity Categories¹

CATEGORIES²	Unweighted N	Percentage Change from Hispanic Origin Mexican (Unweighted)	Weighted N	Percentage Change from Hispanic Origin Mexican (Weighted)
Single category				
Hispanic origin alone (Mexican)	1,219,426	N/A	20,881,890	N/A
Ancestry 1 alone	1,047,172	-14.1 %	17,888,672	-14.3 %
Ancestry 2 alone	27,436	-97.8 %	472,726	-97.7 %
Place of Birth alone	539,993	-55.7 %	9,324,341	-55.3 %
Two categories				
Ancestry 1 or Ancestry 2	1,074,530	-11.9 %	18,360,263	-12.1 %
Hispanic origin (Mexican) or Ancestry 1	1,314,938	7.8 %	22,500,179	7.7 %
Hispanic origin (Mexican) or Ancestry 2	1,232,121	1.0 %	21,101,756	1.1 %
Hispanic origin (Mexican) or POB	1,258,436	3.2 %	21,551,255	3.2 %
Ancestry 1 or POB	1,137,626	-6.7 %	19,453,215	-6.8 %
Ancestry 2 or POB	566,699	-53.5 %	9,784,469	-53.1 %
Three categories				
Hispanic origin (Mexican) or Ancestry 1 or Ancestry 2	1,327,630	8.9 %	22,720,013	8.8 %
Ancestry 1 or Ancestry 2 or POB	1,164,257	-4.5 %	19,912,272	-4.6 %
Hispanic origin (Mexican) or Ancestry 1 or POB	1,331,650	9.2 %	22,785,567	9.1 %
Hispanic origin (Mexican) or Ancestry 2 or POB	1,271,009	4.2 %	21,769,082	4.2 %
Four categories				
Hispanic origin (Mexican) or Ancestry 1 or Ancestry 2 or POB	1,344,220	10.2 %	23,003,362	10.2 %

¹ Frequencies are based on 2000 Census Public Use Microdata Samples, combined 1% and 5% data files (6%)

² The categories are comprised of the responses in Appendix B.

Figure B-1. Degree of Overlap in Mexican Identity Categories




Table B-5. Socio-demographic Differences Between Alternative Definition Groups

	STANDARD DEFINITION (Hispanic-Mexican)		ALTERNATIVE DEFINITION (Ancestry1,2; Place of Birth)		
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	P-value
Population	20,881,890		2,121,471		
Race					
White alone		47.3 %		50.7 %	P<.0001
White and some other race		4.3 %		6.0 %	P<.0001
Black		0.9 %		2.3 %	P<.0001
Asian		0.4 %		0.8 %	P<.0001
Hawaii/PI/Native Am		1.4 %		2.1 %	P<.0001
Other race alone		45.5 %		37.7 %	P<.0001
All other combinations		0.2 %		0.4 %	P<.0001
Educational Attainment					
Persons 25 years and over	10,172,857		1,022,857		
High school graduate or higher		45.8 %		54.3 %	P<.0001
Bachelor's degree or higher		7.5 %		8.6 %	P<.0001
Graduate degree or higher		2.4 %		2.6 %	P=.114
Labor Force Status					
Persons 16 years and over	13,886,049		1,378,712		
In civilian labor force		61.8 % ^a		59.6 % ^a	P<.0001
Employed (in civilian LF)		56.1 % ^a		53.6 % ^a	P<.0001
Unemployed (in civilian LF)		9.3 % ^b		10.1 % ^b	P<.0001
Not in labor force		37.8 % ^a		39.9 % ^a	P<.0001
Mean hours worked		1721.4 ^c		1715.3 ^c	P=.508
Poverty rate					
All persons (in household)		23.2 %		21.5 %	P<.0001
Age and sex					
Male		52.7 %		49.8 %	P<.0001
Mean age		26.0		25.9	P=.871

a= Among those 16 years or older

b= Among those 16 years or older and in civilian labor force

c= Among those 16 years or older and employed

Table B-6. Socio-demographic Differences Between Standard and Inclusive Definitions

	<u>STANDARD DEFINITION</u> (Hispanic-Mexican)			<u>INCLUSIVE DEFINITION</u> (Hispanic-Mexican; Ancestry 1, 2; POB)		
	Number	Percent		Number	Percent	
Race	20,881,890	100.0 %		23,003,362	100.0 %	
White alone		47.3 %			47.6 %	
White and some other race		4.3 %			4.4 %	
Black		0.9 %			1.1 %	
Asian		0.4 %			0.4 %	
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander/Native American		1.4 %			1.5 %	
Other race alone		45.5 %			44.8 %	
All other combinations		0.2 %			0.2 %	
Nativity and Year of Entry						
All persons	20,881,890	100.0 %		23,003,362	100.0 %	
Native		58.5 %			59.6 %	
Foreign born		41.5 %			40.5 %	
Entered before 1990		51.1 % ^a			51.5 % ^a	
Entered between 1990-2000		48.9 % ^a			48.5 % ^a	
Naturalized citizen		22.1 % ^a			22.5 % ^a	
Not a citizen		77.9 % ^a			77.5 % ^a	
Educational Attainment						
Persons 25 years and over	10,172,857			11,195,714		
High school graduate or higher		45.8 %			46.6 %	
Bachelor's degree or higher		7.5 %			7.6 %	
Graduate degree or higher		2.4 %			2.5 %	
Ability to Speak English						
Persons 5 years and over	18,497,271			20,371,164		
Speak other language at home		78.8 %			77.6 %	
Do not speak English very well		43.1 % ^b			42.1 % ^b	
Persons 5 years and over in households	18,133,477			19,983,394		
In linguistically isolated households		26.4 %			25.6 %	
Labor Force Status						
Persons 16 years and over	13,886,049			15,264,761		
In civilian labor force		61.8 %			61.6 %	
Employed (in civilian LF)		56.1 % ^c			55.8 % ^c	
Unemployed (in civilian LF)		9.3 % ^d			9.3 % ^d	
Not in labor force		37.8 % ^c			38.0 % ^c	
Mean hours worked		1721.4 ^e			1720.9 ^e	
Occupation						
Employed persons 16 years and over	7,839,715	100.0 %		8,584,854	100.0 %	
Mgmt, professional, related occupations		15.0 %			15.3 %	
Service		21.8 %			21.7 %	
Sales and office		20.7 %			21.2 %	
Farming, fishing, and forestry		4.0 %			3.8 %	

Construction, extraction, and maintenance	15.2 %	15.0 %
Production, transportation, and material moving	23.0 %	22.7 %
Military	0.3 %	0.3 %
INCOME in 1999		
Households		
Median income (dollars)	33,500	33,400
Mean income (dollars)	42,842	42,860
Poverty rate (all persons in household)	23.2 %	23.0 %
Household size		
Average number of persons in household	3.9	3.9
Marital status		
Persons 15 years and over	14,238,020	15,654,881
Now married	53.4 %	53.2 %
Widowed	2.9 %	3.0 %
Divorced	6.0 %	6.2 %
Separated	3.2 %	3.2 %
Never married	34.5 %	34.5 %
Number of own children under 18 years old living in household for women age 35-44^f	2.0	2.0
Age and sex		
Male	52.7 %	52.4 %
Mean age	26.0	26.0
a=	d= Among those 16 or older in civilian labor force	
Among those foreign born		
b=	e= Among those 16 or older and employed	
Among those 5 or older		
c=	f = Among those householder or spouse of householder	
Among those 16 or older		

Table B-7. Comparison of Mexican Americans to U.S. Population

	<u>Standard Definition</u> (Hispanic-Mexican)		<u>Inclusive Definition</u> (Hispanic-Mexican; Ancestry 1, 2; POB)		<u>U.S. Population</u>	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Total Population	20,881,890		23,003,362		281,421,906	
Race		100.0 %		100.0 %		100.0 %
White alone or with some other race		51.6 % ^a		52.1 % ^a		77.1 %
Educational Attainment						
Persons 25 years and over						
High school graduate or higher		45.8 %		46.6 %		84.1 %
Bachelor's degree or higher		7.5 %		7.6 %		25.6 %
Labor Force Status						
Persons 16 years and over	13,886,049		15,264,761		217,168,077	
Employed (in civilian LF)		56.1 %		55.8 %		59.7 %
Unemployed (in civilian LF)		9.3 %		9.3 %		5.8 %
Not in labor force		37.8 %		38.0 %		36.1 %
Occupation						
Management, professional, and related occupations		15.0 %		15.3 %		33.6 %
INCOME in 1999						
Households						
Median income (dollars)	33,500		33,400		42,187	
Poverty rate						
All persons (in household)		23.2 %		23.0 %		12.4 %

a= % of white alone and white with anything else is combined